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Abstract 
The management of working capital, in the context of this study, refers to the management of current assets and liabilities which 
it is applied to equilibrate current assets and liabilities. So, the control of current assets and liabilities is of great importance. 
Therefore, mechanisms are essential to monitor and control this kind of management. Appropriate corporate governance includes 
of mechanisms that help maintain an optimal working capital in an organization. Hence, the purpose of the present study is to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on the management efficiency of working capital in accepted companies in 
Tehran's stock exchange for the period of 2008-2013. To achieve the objectives of this study, a sample was selected of 115 
companies through elimination sampling. This study used mechanisms such as size of the board of directors, independence of the 
board of directors, institutional stockholders and ownership concentration. The variables used for measuring the working capital 
management include accounts payable, cash conversion cycle, cash holdings, current ratio and management efficiency of 
working capital. The findings of this study indicate that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in improving 
the efficiency of working capital 
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Efficient management of working capital is necessary for the survival of the most companies and the 
management of working capital refers to the management of assets and liabilities. The optimization of residual 
working capital helps to the minimization related to the working capital management and increases the company's 
free cash flow (Gunsun, 2007). The inefficient policy of the working capital management arises from the weak 
corporate governance which has a negative impact on the stockholders' value. The influential corporate governance 
plays as a mechanism in the company's reservers management (Gill and Biger, 2013). 
According to Kinz's theory, companies save the cash for precautionary, speculative and transactional motives 
(Besley and Brigham, 2005; Gill and Shah, 2012). Kim et al. (2011) state that the precautionary and transactional 
motives have an important role in manifesting the determinant factors of cash holding. The surplus cash in the 
companies' accountings is not necessarily profitable for the company. The surplus cash may occur due to the weak 
corporate governance. Equilibrium, hierarchy and free cash flow theories are applied to explain the pattern of cash 
holding level. According to the equilibrium theory, the optimal cash holding is achieved by the weighted average of 
marginal costs and marginal benifits of cash holding (Afza and Adnan, 2007). 
Cash holding cost is the opportunity cost to invest in the current assets. Mariz's equilibrium theory (1984) suggest 
that, for financing the investment, companies first resort to the accumulated earnings and internal reservers (for 
example, cash in hand), then go towards the risk free and risky debts and finally select the financing through stock in 
order to minimize information asymmetry costs and other financial costs. According to Afza and Adnan's view 
(2007), holding the optimal level of liquidity is necessary for the organization in order to smooth the company's 
operation. The cash holding level is distinguishable through the company's policies about the requirements of the 
working capital management, cash flow management, dividend, investment and assets management (Epler et al., 
1999). 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Nadiri (1969) was the first person who studied the working capital management. Since 1969, several researchers 
established new theories about holding an optimal level of cash balances by using Nadiri's model. But few studies 
have been already done about the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the management efficiency of 
working capital. Among working capital items, cash is considered the most important cash assets which is the 
criterion of the company's ability to fulfil its obligations. Although cash holding is important for fulfilling the 
obligations, the idle cash does not add value to the company. Yet, the companies need to maintain cash reserve's in 
order to ensure that timing of cash movement provides the positive cash flow. So, the optimal level of held reserves 
is a vital element which allows the companies to enhance their business (Gill and Shah, 2012). 
Corporate governance plays an important role in controlling the working capital management through 
regulating policies. You cannot ignore the managing directors role, size of the board of directors, independence of 
the board of directors, managerial ownership and audit committee in the working capital management (Gill and 
Biger, 2013). Duality status of the managing director, size of the board of directors and nonexecutive directors ratio 
help to the maintence and optimal level of the working capital of the organization. Also, the period of office of 
board of directors helps improving the working capital management (Gill and Shah, 2012).  
By using Canadian companies data, Gill and Mathur (2011) explored that sale growth positively influences 
cash holding level for the financial period of 2009-2011. The findings also suggest that duality status of the board of 
directors and its size reversely effect on the net working capital. By using 83 Iranian companies in Tehran's stock 
exchange for the period of 2001-2010, Valipor et. al (2012) explored that there was a negative relationship between 
sales growth and cash conversion cycle. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
 
1. There is a relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and accounts payable management. 
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2. There is a relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and cash conversion cycle management. 
3. There is a relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and cash management. 
 
3.1. Statistical Population and Sampling Method 
 
The statistical population of this study was all accepted companies in Tehran's stock exchange in the period of 
2006-2011. The sampling method of this study was a systematic elimination one.  
 
4. Research Variables 
 
Dependent variables: The dependent variables of this study are average debt payment period, cash conversion 
cycle, cash holding level and current ratio.  
Independent variables: The independent variables of this study are size of the board of directors, independence 
of the board of directors' members, institutional stockholders and institutional ownership concentration. 
 
5. Research Findings 
 
 Table 1.  Shows Descriptive Statistics of the Study's Variables. The Average Debts Paying Period is 65.97 days. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Study's Variables 
Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode Mean 
Abbreviation 
signs Variable's Name 
766.46 0.303 95.49 58.51 83.43 AR Accounts Payable 
414.32 2.020 67.54 103.27 112.06 INV Cash Conversion Cycle 
312.11 2.723 42.05 57.83 65.97 AP Cash Holding 
980.36 0.000 108.20 86.48 113.40 CCC Current Ratio 
3.509 0.023 0.521 1.955 1.861 CH Size of Board of Directors 
2.306 0.000 0.266 0.167 0.248 CR Independence of Board of Directors 
4.085 0.000 0.271 0.168 0.242 CCE Institutional Stockholders 
9 2 0.926 6.00 5.65 BRDSIZE Ownership Concentration 
13.99 10.77 0.571 11.85 11.89 SIZE Size 
12.47 0.067 1.604 1.134 1.667 GO Growth Opportunities 
3.060 0.040 0.222 0.603 0.586 FL Financial Leverage 
0.916 -0.207 0.155 0.161 0.185 ROA Return on Assets 
8 1 2.086 3.00 3.54 TENURE Tenure of Auditor 
 
It seems that different credit conditions govern in the supply market of sample companies' products and supply 
market of materials and goods so that the average credit period in the supply market and materials and goods supply 
market is 83 and 66 days, respectively. The average cash holding level and current ratio is 1.861 and 0.248, 
respectively which are significantly consistent with the studies of Gill and Shah (2012) and Gill and Biger (2013). 
The results of table 2 indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship between the size of the board of 
directors and debt payment period so the accounts payable management (increase of payment period) is more 
effective in companies with small boards of directors compared to companies with big ones. 
Also, there is a positive relationship between the independence of the board of directors and the debt payment 
period and it denotes that the increase of nonexecutive directors of the board of directors causes the improvement of 
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accounts payable management. Adjusted determination coefficient indicates that 6.1% of the changes of debt 
payment period (dependent variable) is explained by control and independent variables. Durbin-Watson statistic 
which is 1.780 indicates the non-exsitence of autocorrelation between error functions in regression equation. The 
amount of F significance level is 0.000 and less than 0.05 which denotes significance of the model. 
 
Table 2. Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Debt Payment Period 
INV=α0+β1 BRDSIZEit + β2 BRDINDit + β3 INOWNit + β4 OWNCONit + β5 SIZEit + β6 MBVit + β7 LEVit + β8 ROAit + β9 
TENUREit + εit 
VIF P-Value t Beta  
- 0.011 2.536 246.33 C 
1.022 0.000 -4.091 -19.14 BRDSIZE 
1.034 0.001 3.413 99.03 BRDIND 
1.053 0.092 1.687 36.79 INOWN 
1.00 0.528 0.632 7.661 OWNCON 
1.014 0.438 -0.777 -5.865 SIZE 
1.552 0.440 0.772 2.569 MBV 
1.282 0.906 -0.118 -2.577 LEV 
1.527 0.002 -3.063 -104.55 ROA 
1.009 0.045 -2.010 -4.147 TENURE 
0.061=R2 D-W=1.780 F (Statistic)=0.000 F=5.319  
 
The results of table 3 indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship between the size of the board of 
directors and institutional stockholders and cash conversion cycle, so, in companies which the members of the board 
of directors are low and the rate of institutional stockholders ownership is small, cash conversion cycle is shorter 
than other companies. Adjusted determination coefficient indicates that 5% of the changes of cash conversion cycle 
(dependent variable) is explained by control and independent variables. 
Durbin-Watson statistic which is 1.619 denotes the non-existence of autocorrelation between error functions in 
regression equation. The amount of F significance level is 0.000 and less than 0.05 which represents significance of 
the model. 
 
Table 3. Relationship Between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and cashConversion Cycle 
INV=α0+β1 BRDSIZEit + β2 BRDINDit + β3 INOWNit + β4 OWNCONit + β5 SIZEit + β6 MBVit + β7 LEVit + β8 ROAit + β9 
TENUREit + εit 
VIF P-Value t Beta  
- 0.000 5.224 495.85 C 
1.022 0.008 -2.645 -12.092 BRDSIZE 
1.034 0.259 1.130 32.030 BRDIND 
1.053 0.005 -2.803 -59.73 INOWN 
1.00 0.356 -0.923 -10.93 OWNCON 
1.014 0.005 -2.832 -20.89 SIZE 
1.552 0.015 2.445 79.85 MBV 
1.282 0.529 -0.630 -13.38 LEV 
1.527 0.867 0.167 5.572 ROA 
1.009 0.491 -0.689 5.572 TENURE 
0.050=R2 D-W=1.619 F (Statistic)=0.000 F =4.535  
 
Table 4 indicates that there is a negative and significant relationship between the size of the board of directors 
and cash holding level, so cash management is more effective in companies with small boards of directors compared 
to companies with big ones. Also, there is a positive relationship between the independence of the board of directors 
and cash holding level and it denotes that the increase of number of nonexecutive directors of the board of directors 
causes improvement of cash management. Adjusted determination coefficient represents that 5.1% of the changes of 
cash holding level (dependent variable) is explained by control and independent variables. Durbin-Watson statistic 
which is 1.534 denotes the non-existence of autocorrelation between error functions in regression equation. The 
amount of F significance level is 0.000 and less than 0.05 which indicates the significance of the model. 
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Table 4.  Relationship Between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and cash Management 
INV=α0+β1 BRDSIZEit + β2 BRDINDit + β3 INOWNit + β4 OWNCONit + β5 SIZEit + β6 MBVit + β7 LEVit + β8 ROAit + β9 
TENUREit + εit 
VIF P-Value t Beta  
- 0.000 7.925 3.757 C 
1.022 0.039 -2.071 -0.047 BRDSIZE 
1.034 0.015 2.446 0.346 BRDIND 
1.053 0.441 0.772 0.082 INOWN 
1.00 0.435 0.781 0.046 OWNCON 
1.014 0.000 -4.213 -0.155 SIZE 
1.552 0.043 -2.028 -0.033 MBV 
1.282 0.726 0.350 0.037 LEV 
1.527 0.488 0.693 0.115 ROA 
1.009 0.560 -0.583 -0.006 TENURE 
0.051=R2 D-W=1.534 F (Statistic)=0.000 F =3.504  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The present study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
management efficiency of working capital of the accepted companies in Tehran's stock exchange. Therefore, 
considering the sample conditions, 115 companies were selected as the sample. For corporate governance, 
mechanisms of the size of the board of directors, independence of the board of directors, institutional stockholders 
and ownership concentration were used. Also, accounts payable, cash conversion cycle, cash holding, liquidity ratio 
and management efficiency of working capital variables were used to measure working capital management. The 
results indicated that corporate governance mechanisms cause the improvement of management efficiency of 
working capital. These results are consistent with the findings of Gill and Mathur (2011), Gill and Shah (2012) and 
Gill Biger (2013). They indicated that small boards of directors have more effectiveness compared to big boards of 
directors in decision-making process. Among control variables, it was indicated that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the company's size and liquidity management while there is a negative and 
significant relationship between the company's size and accounts payable management, cash conversion cycle and 
cash holding level. Results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between the growth 
opportunities and working capital management. The obtained evidences are consistent with the findings of Gill and 
Shah (2013). Hence, working capital management is conducted more effectively in companies whose growth 
opportunities are high. There is a negative and significant relationship between the financial leverage and cash 
management.  
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